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The urban regime theory has placed the decisional power of urban policy makers in the foreground. From 
this perspective, enduring governing coalitions can in fact manage to change the consolidated urban 
policy mix to foster great changes in the social and economic context. The urban regime theory labels this 
capacity ‘power to’. 
Although this higher capacity has frequently been affirmed, the literature has neglected to look at the 
framing mechanisms and the policy-making processes that allow a new agenda to emerge and be 
implemented. The present article has the aim of addressing this matter, and in particular of trying to 
answer two main questions: 1) if an incubation phase lays the foundations for the emergence of a new 
policy agenda, how does this process take place? 2) Is the new agenda a by-product of sectorial policy 
negotiations or is it the output of a collective effort? The findings of an in-depth analysis on a case study 
are presented and discussed in order to address these questions. 
 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, urban governance studies (Logan and Swanstrom 
1990; Clark 1994; Harding 1999; John 2001; Savitch and Kantor 2002; DiGaetano and 
Strom 2003; Denters and Rose 2005) have criticized pure structuralist theories, which 
have considered urban policy-making as being totally dependent on the dynamics of 
global capitalism (Peterson 1981). From the urban governance perspective, although not 
free from structural constraints, local actors can exercise a significant influence on 
urban policies and affect the life conditions of residents (Wolman and Goldsmith 1990; 
Di Gaetano and Lawless 1999; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Sellers 2002; Di Gaetano and 
Strom 2003; Pinson 2010; Greasely, Wolman and John 2011; Wolman 2012; Pierre 
2014). 
The literature on urban neoliberalism and entrepreneurialism has highlighted that the 
present world-wide ‘generalization and standardization’ of urban policies (Beal and 
Rousseaux 2014), which are generally focused on the imperatives of economic 
competitiveness and city attractiveness, could be symptoms of non-local factors, such as  
economic pressures and the hegemony of neoliberal ideology (Jessop 2002; Peck e 
Tickell 2002; Brenner 2004; Theodore, Peck and Brenner 2011; Theodore and Peck 
2012; Davies 2014). However, the local welfare state is not dead and wealth 
redistribution has not been abandoned totally, especially in European cities (Le Galès 
2002).1 Moreover, several ‘alternative’ economic policies are spreading in diverse urban 
contexts, providing evidence of the existence of a not too narrow scope for urban 
governance (Fuller 2010; Geddes and Sullivan 2011).2 
Within this paradigm, the urban regime theory, developed from the works of Elkin 
(1987) and Stone (1989), has placed the decisional power of urban policy-makers in the 
foreground. From the urban regime perspective, not only can local actors systematically 
affect the context through their public decisions but, in particular situations, stable and 
enduring governing coalitions can even change the whole consolidated policy mix of a 
city through the implementation of a new policy agenda. Stone (2001; 2005; 2006) has 
                                                
1 With reference to the capacity of eliminating inequalities, Stone (2004, p. 15) stated that “local 
governance itself is not potent enough to bring that about, but it can make a difference between 
aggravating or ameliorating the inequalities of a stratified society”. 
2 See, for example, the recent symposiums and special issues published in three international reviews: 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2010, 34 (1); Métropoles, 2014 (15); Urban 
Studies, 2014, 51 (15). 
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labeled ‘power to’ as being the capacity to promote and sustain new urban agendas and 
to foster great changes in the social and economic context.  
Since the first work by Stone on Atlanta, several studies have been conducted on 
urban regimes, in particular in the USA, but also in some European and Asian countries. 
However, the literature has mainly placed emphasis on “seemingly static public-private 
relationships”, and has largely neglected to focus on the power to and its dynamics 
(Sapotichne and Jones 2012, p. 446). Many scholars have in fact mainly focused 
attention on the structure and features of governance arrangements, on factors that can 
favor or damage urban regimes, and on the brokering or steering role of specific actors 
(De Leon 1992; Di Gaetano and Klemanski 1993; Strom 1996; John and Cole 1998; 
DiGaetano and Lawless 1999; Stone et al. 2001; Dormois 2006; Holman 2007; Tretter 
2008; Belligni and Ravazzi 2012). Recognizing this gap, Stone himself (2001) stated 
that a process perspective on decisional mechanisms could actually offer a 
complementary viewpoint which could be useful to integrate the existing knowledge on 
urban regimes. In particular, the analysis on how common purposes are shaped by 
governing coalitions and how a subsequent new policy agenda emerges could help 
understand why governance arrangements can last without formal enforcement, and 
could help identify the existence of clear policy-making patterns in urban regimes.  
The present article has the aim of addressing the matter of ‘power to’. In particular, 
the analysis has been driven by two main research questions. The first concerns what 
can be called the ‘incubation phase’. According to Stone (2001; 2004), agenda building 
is in fact preceded by a phase in which a common frame is shaped by the local élite 
(Stone 2001; 2004). If this is true, the incubation phase has remained a black box, and 
the literature has not yet shed light on the mechanisms and processes that characterize 
this early stage of an urban regime. Therefore, this article addresses the issue: how does 
the incubation process take place and does it present a particular pattern? The second 
question pertains to the emergence of a new policy agenda. The literature on urban 
regimes has also neglected this policy-making dimension to a great extent. In order to 
contribute to the filling of this gap, the article in particular focuses on the following 
issue: when a new agenda emerges within an urban regime in order to change the 
consolidated urban policy mix, how does this process develop? Is the new agenda a by-
product of sectorial policy negotiations that take place within a general frame, or is it 
the outcome of a collective effort?  
In order to address these two questions, an in-depth analysis of a case study is 
presented. The case refers to the establishment of an urban regime and the emergence of 
a new urban agenda in the city of Turin, one of the three old poles of the Italian 
industrial triangle (together with Milan and Genoa) and the capital of the Italian 
automotive industry. During the 1980s, the city underwent a long socio-economic crisis, 
which was mainly caused by deindustrialization processes that produced several social 
problems - companies and jobs were lost and the population diminished. After a period 
of relative inaction, the city attempted to react through the collaborative action of a wide 
governing coalition and the implementation of a new urban agenda. A heterogeneous 
public-private governing coalition promoted what was then an ambitious new agenda, 
through which the consolidated policy mix was changed to foster the start of a new 
urban development model. 
The case study was carried out over a period of seven years (2006-2012) as part of a 
wider in-depth research that addressed several issues: the emergence of the urban 
regime and its features, the outputs that the regime has produced, the consolidation 
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mechanisms, the urban governance coalition and the community power structure 
(Belligni and Ravazzi 2012; 2013). The processes and mechanisms through which the 
new agenda has been shaped and implemented are the focus of the present work. The 
whole research has been conducted adopting a mix of methods and sources: 
documentary sources, in-depth semi-structured interviews with fifty individuals3, 
network analysis (Barabasi 2002; Kadushin 2004; Vargiu 2007) and a process-
sequencing method (George and Bennet 2005; Howlett 2009). The latter method has in 
particular been applied to answer the aforementioned two research questions. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section frames the issue. Section 2 
traces the profile of the case study, and briefly explains the innovations of the urban 
agenda implemented over the last twenty years. The third, fourth and fifth sections 
describe the key sequences of events that have led to the emergence of a common 
frame, the formation of the governing coalition and the construction of a new urban 
agenda. The findings are summarized in the conclusion section. 
 
 
Urban regime and policy agenda 
 
The policy mix of a city (as well as of any other territory) is usually relatively stable or 
just undergoes marginal adjustments (Rast 2001; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Sapotichne 
and Jones 2012). However, according to the urban regime theory, it can change 
radically when a new urban agenda is promoted and implemented through the 
mobilization of extraordinary efforts and resources. The focus of a new urban agenda is 
not just the implementation of a particular project or a single investment program, but 
the promotion of a set of community-wide problem-solving efforts, whose aim is not to 
solve the whole range of problems, but to strategically redirect urban policies toward 
prioritarian directions (John and Cole 1998; Stone 2002; 2004). 
The implementation of a new urban agenda becomes possible through the action of 
relatively long and stable public-private governing coalitions (Stone 1993; 2001; 2004; 
John and Cole 1998). From this perspective, an urban regime “provides a capacity to act 
and bring resources to bear on the identifying agenda to a degree that would not happen 
without the arrangements that constitute the regime” (Stone 2001, p. 21). Three main 
elements explain the higher capacity of an urban regime to foster a large change in the 
consolidated policy mix of a city: 1) informality of the relationships between the 
stakeholders, which favors the expansion of the resource base; 2) repeated interactions, 
which favor the establishment of long-lasting cooperative games, and give stability to 
the relationships in the case of temporary dissatisfaction of some interests; 3) adequacy 
of the resources in relation to the goals (Stone 2001). 
Recalling the agenda-setting theories (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and to a certain 
extent also the multiple streams theory on the political success of ideas (Kingdon 1984), 
Stone stressed the importance of urban regime incubation, during which strategic actors 
manage to frame some common issues in a way that favors the convergence of other 
actors toward them. Moreover, the credibility of the purposes and a certain 
                                                
3 The respondents were chosen because of their privileged position, in terms of proximity to the decision-
making processes, and/or their advocacy role within different policy networks: politicians, local 
governors, civil servants, members of the main local interest groups, journalists, academics and managers 
of public, private and quasi-governmental organizations. Some people were also interviewed twice during 
the period. For details about the methodology see Belligni and Ravazzi (2012). 
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institutionalization of the governance arrangements4 can help the governing coalition to 
maintain the direction of the agenda in the medium-long run (Stone 2004; Dormois 
2006; Belligni and Ravazzi 2012). If this is true, how do these issues end up being 
shared by different groups with different and often divergent interests and visions? 
Tretter (2008), analyzing the case of Glasgow, showed how an exogenous frame (the 
one offered by the ‘European City of Culture’ Call) can favor the convergence of élite 
local members toward a core idea. The present case study will shed some light on the 
processes and mechanisms through which this process of framing can develop. 
Once some goals gather support from a wide range of local actors, the emergence of 
a clearly defined agenda cannot be taken for granted. “Alternative agendas come on the 
scene with frequency, but typically fade away because they lack supporting elements” 
(Stone 2004, p. 12). Therefore, how do issue concerns come to be specified as purposes, 
and how are they linked, enlarged and refined for action? 
By stating ‘the puzzle to be solved is how cooperation can be achieved without an 
overarching system of command or without reliance on a system of market exchange’ 
(Stone 2004, 10), Stone pointed out the importance of behind-the scenes negotiations as 
the main mode of governance to generate a shared policy agenda. However, he has also 
recognized that no urban regime can be built entirely on selective incentives, and that 
schemes of cooperation can be multifaceted. Analyzing the case of Saint-Étienne, Beal, 
Dormois and Pinson (2010) suggested that the lack of mutual recognition processes 
among the élite local members was the main cause of the city’s weak capacity to shape 
a new strategy of local redevelopment. Rast (2009) stated that innovation in 
governmental structures and in formal political institutions also helped the governing 
capacity of the post-war Chicago urban regime. This paper tries to add some further 
empirical findings, by focusing on the decision-making processes that have led to the 
emergence of the new agenda in Turin. 
 
 
A new agenda for a post-industrial city 
 
Turin is one of the largest cities in Italy. It was the first capital of the newly founded 
Italian State in the XIX century, and it is the site of the headquarters of the FIAT 
automobile industry (now FIAT-Chrysler Automobiles). The city experienced an 
economic and demographic boom in the 1950s and 1960s, which was mainly driven by 
the manufacturing sector, and then a period of change from the end of the 1970s. Over 
these last decades, the city has lost more than 10% of the population and of its GDP, 
and has seen the local economy change from an industrial-type economy to a service 
one. 
In the mid-1990s, the city started to react to this situation through the introduction of 
a new urban agenda, with the aim of fostering a systemic change of the consolidated 
policy mix and at least a partial change in its social and economic conditions. During 
the first half of the 1980s, Turin was still known as a city that was mainly attentive to 
social policies and education. The Left-wing governments that ruled the city over the 
previous decades had focused efforts on improving municipal welfare, public education 
services and the quality of life in peripheral neighborhoods, and relationships with the 
business community and in particular with FIAT had been conflictual (Locke 1995). 
                                                
4 Dormois (2006, 852) labels this institutionalization process with the happy expression ‘stabilisation de 
régles et de récits’. 
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After the 1985 elections, while the socio-economic crisis was getting worse, a new 
Centrist five-party coalition replaced the Leftist government. This new coalition, which 
governed until 1992, was unstable and quarrelsome, and was dominated by “gain 
politicians” who managed public resources in a personalistic (and often clientelistic) 
way. In that period, the policy-makers produced disjointed plans, which often resulted 
in decisional impasses. In 1992, after the fourth collapse of the party coalition and the 
arrest of many public officials and politicians on charges of corruption, a special 
national commissioner replaced the city council. An unprecedented political crisis 
caused the already critical socio-economic situation to become worse. 
In April 1993, the commissioner decided on new elections, which resulted in the 
unexpected victory of a new mayor, Valentino Castellani, a moderate Catholic professor 
from the Politecnico di Torino (Technical Engineering University), who was supported 
by a novel alliance between the Left Democrats Party (Partito dei Democratici di 
Sinistra, PDS5) and the local liberal bourgeoisie. The new mayor led the municipal 
administration for two consecutive terms of office until 2001, when a professional PDS 
politician, Sergio Chiamparino, replaced the former mayor for another two consecutive 
terms. Although the two mayors were different in background and style of action, the 
latter continued in the wake of the former, both maintaining the alliance with the liberal 
bourgeoisie and implementing most of the projects that had been planned during the 
previous years (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012). 
The new agenda that was implemented over these twenty years was composed of 
three main policy areas. The first set of policies focused on housing expansion, 
renovation of the urban center, and major infrastructures: the most important public 
works involved placing the railway underground (more than 7 km of open-air tracks, 
which had previously split the city, were laid underground), construction of the first 
subway line, and more than 110 million cubic meters of new buildings in abandoned 
industrial areas (Figure 1), urban regeneration projects in some poor neighbourhoods, 
the expansion of the two academic institutions (the Politecnico di Torino and Turin 
University), the restoration of many buildings as well as all the squares and monuments 
in the historical center, the construction of a new railway station and the renovation of 
the old one. The 2006 Winter Olympic Games, which Turin unexpectedly gained in 
2000, brought huge financial resources to the city, contributing to this set of policies 
and to its updating through new infrastructures and buildings. The visible result was a 
drastic reshaping of the urban landscape. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The second set of policies evokes the idea of an urban district for the ‘knowledge 
sector’: research centers, business incubators and poles to host innovative companies 
have been created since the mid-1990s (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
                                                
5 After the fall of Communism, the Communist Party split into two parties: the PRC, which was an 
expression of the more radical wing, and the PDS, a more center-left-wing party. The PDS then became 
the Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra, DS) in 1998 and the Democratic Party (PD) in 2007, 
which combined  most of the DS members and  a part of the  moderate catholic politicians. 
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Last but not least, the city invested a huge amount of resources in activities and 
projects for entertainment and leisure6. Large events pertaining to the arts and design, to 
music and film festivals, to food and wine fairs became the most visible components of 
the new cultural life of the city, but a completely renewed museum system and new 
theatres were also launched, and a Film Commission was created in order to attract 
movie companies to the region (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 here 
 
Social policies and environmental policies were not neglected totally and the local 
government continued to provide social services and to invest in some environmental 
projects, but the resources mobilized for these policy areas did not increase over the 
decades, and the few efforts that were made were not remotely adequate to address the 
new social and environmental problems of the city (increasing inequality, immigrant 
integration, high level of air pollution, etc.).7 
As far as a definition of the Turin agenda is concerned, scholars usually distinguish 
between two main types of urban agenda: pro-welfare or social-centred and pro-growth 
or market-centred (Stone and Sanders 1987; Jones and Bachelor 1993; Stone 1993; 
2004; Di Gaetano and Lawless 1999; Quilley 2000).8 Pro-welfare agendas promote 
strict land-use regulations, investments in infrastructures and public services, education 
and social assistance policies, as well as the redistribution of resources and functions in 
favour of the poorest citizens and the most problematic neighborhoods. Market-centred 
agendas instead tend to neglect social policies in favor of a public action that has the 
direct aim of sustaining the productive sectors and facilitating commercial exchanges, 
through the provision of subsidies, the construction of highways, of railways and of 
logistic platforms, and the concentration of functions and facilities downtown (Savitch 
and Kantor 2002).9 
On the whole, it can be stated that Turin has moved from a highly social-centered 
and low market-centered policy mix toward a new clearly market-centered and less 
social-centered agenda. It is instead questionable whether this new agenda can be 
defined as a clear neoliberal project. According to the literature, local neoliberalism is 
characterized by policies that promote free market, citizen mobility, low taxation and 
public spending reductions (Imbroscio 2011; Blanco, Griggs and Sullivan 2014). In this 
context, the Turin agenda presents contrasting elements: the municipal and regional 
regulations on land use and also those on social services were reformed, but not 
substantially downsized to give way to free market dynamics; gentrification processes 
took place in some central neighborhoods, but housing programs were mainly focused 
                                                
6 This strategic axis is in part different from the one that characterizes the entertainment machines of 
some American cities (Lloyd and Clark 2001), but it has similarities with some experiences of other 
European cities (Harding et al. 2004; Rast 2009; Rousseau 2009). 
7 In Turin, like in other urban regimes, a slogan was also coined as a flagship of the new course of action:  
the Atlanta slogan was ‘the city too busy to hate’ and Chicago was named ‘the city that works’, while 
Turin was labeled  ‘the city always on the move’. 
8 DiGaetano and Lawless (1999, 550) distinguished another type of urban agenda: the ‘caretaker’ agenda, 
which is ‘confined to routine service provision such as police and fire protection, refuse collection, and the 
like’. However, according to the authors, a caretaker agenda is promoted without any effort to achieve 
real social or economic changes through urban policies or programs. 
9 Obviously, as Savitch and Kantor (2002) demonstrated, urban agendas do not usually completely 
neglect the policies of the other category. 
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on supporting citizens in their own homes rather than fostering their mobility toward 
other places (with the exception of a part of the small XVIII Century central district); 
most funding was provided by the public sector (municipal, regional or national), and 
the municipal government both took out huge loans and increased local taxes in order to 
sustain such an extraordinary financial effort.10 
 
 
Three purposes for a common goal 
 
It is necessary to go back to the end of the 1980s in order to investigate whether some 
common aims emerged before the formation of a definite urban regime and the 
introduction of a new agenda. It was in fact in those years that the increasing social and 
economic problems became urban problems, which had to be faced through urban 
policies and not just through long-awaited national initiatives. The closure of some 
factories and the loss of jobs took on a ‘physical’ shape: urban voids became visible to 
all the citizens and the city risked losing its identity. Groups of intellectuals and Left-
wing politicians began to reflect publicly on the nature of the crisis and on the tangible 
risks for the city. 
The image of a dual city emerged from books and conferences that were written and 
organized by local politicians and academics (Berta and Chiamparino 1985; Bagnasco 
1986; 1990), and the inability to adapt the local society to the changing economic 
context was blamed on the local political class of the 1970s and 1980s. There were four 
main objections: a) its industrialism, namely the anachronistic belief of the politicians 
that manufacturing companies should have remained the only drivers of the local 
development, b) its tendency to reproduce the divisions of the industrial environment in 
the political system, c) the lack of a negotiation habit in both industrial and political 
relations, d) the lack of public management skills. This interpretation, which initially 
divided the political forces, became hegemonic in just a few years. Sergio Chiamparino, 
who was a PC leader, recalled that period with the following words: 
 
Already in 1984, before some books explicitly addressed the issue, some party colleagues and 
I presented a document in which we asked our comrades to change perspective. [...] In some 
of us, a paradigm shift had matured, and we tried to explain to those who did not think alike 
why our view was the most appropriate to deal with a changing society. But it actually took 
some years before our efforts were successful. 
   
In the same period, two civil society groups became active and started to press the 
political class with a list of requests. The first group (the so-called ‘Group of 70’) was 
composed of businessmen and professionals led by a powerful banker, who was also a 
member of the Board of Directors of the local Chamber of Commerce. The group 
published a pamphlet entitled ‘An alternative to decline’, which suggested some main 
policy measures: reviving the construction industry, investing in infrastructures and 
privatising municipal public service companies (Torino Incontra 1992). The second 
group was composed of academics from the Politecnico di Torino. They started 
thinking about how the city could facilitate the internationalization of the research 
sector and they ended up convinced that the city had to create a liveable urban 
                                                
10 Turin is currently at the top of the national ranking pertaining to the level of property taxation and one 
of the most indebted cities in Italy. 
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environment, in order to attract students and scholars. One of the protagonists of this 
group was Valentino Castellani, who recalled that period, after almost twenty-five 
years, with the following words: 
 
We had two main paradigms in mind, which came out after years of contacts and experiences 
with other European and American academic institutions. The first had to do with  
internationalization. We thought it was necessary to have not only international relations but 
to attract people and talents here from the rest of the world. In order to push the lever to 
internationalization, the urban environment had to become adequate. Therefore, the second 
paradigm was the necessary relationship of our academic institution with the local 
government. 
 
A common goal emerged from these convergent forces: the city would have to focus 
on an extraordinary pro-growth effort. One businessman and member of the Board of 
Directors of the Chamber of Commerce remembered the slogan that most civil society 
leaders and Center-Left wing politicians used to repeat in that period: ‘we must start 
with boosting wealth, because only if the cake is larger can we manage to better 
redistribute the slices’ (I.14). 
In a few months, three purposes about how this common goal could be reached 
became popular and widely shared. They clearly seemed close to the ideas that had been 
circulating in the second half of the 1980s. First, ‘the city had to move beyond FIAT 
and abandon industrialism in favor of a diversification of the local economy, with the 
automotive industry leaving room for new kinds of activities’ (I.41). The second idea 
concerned the policy mix for the upcoming years: in order to avert decline, the city ‘had 
to start with some short-term policies to boost economic growth’ (I.30). The third 
suggestion was addressed to the political system, asking it to ‘innovate not only the 
outputs but also the processes’ (I.4), through the formation of a great alliance between 
the moderate forces of the Center-Left and the liberal groups of the business class. 
In short, besides the partially aleatoric nature of these concurring events, some of 
which happened independently of one another (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012), the framing 
process that posed the base for the subsequent emergence of the new agenda took place 
through relatively linear dynamics, which broadly recall the classic dispute model 
(Felstiner et al. 1980): first a process of ‘naming’, the formation of a common 
perception of the main local problems and their proper urban dimension; then, a more 
ideological process of ‘blaming’, which developed in the form of an explicit showdown 
with the past, through the construction of a narrative on the missed modernization of the 
city; finally, a more purposive phase (‘claiming’), with the shaping of some core beliefs 
and some key purposes for a common goal. 
 
 
Regime-building 
 
In 1993, the Parliament approved a public administration reform that included some 
new rules for local governments: among others, a new two-round electoral system and a 
strong mayor-type model of local government. Turin was the first Italian city to use the 
new electoral rules and to experience the new form of government; this took place in 
April 1993. 
The upcoming elections offered the opportunity of testing the wide convergence 
toward the common purposes and the main goal of a systemic pro-growth change. The 
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PDS chose to run with a candidate who was seen favourably by the liberal bourgeoisie, 
not only against the Right-wing candidate, but also against the mayor who had led the 
city during the 1970s, and who decided to run again with the support of the radical Left-
wing parties. The two main policy entrepreneurs involved in the operation remembered 
that time with these words: 
 
I met the PDS secretary at the Politecnico di Torino, in an informal meeting with the Rector, a 
prominent entrepreneur and two academic intellectuals, in order to find the name of a common 
candidate. On that occasion, we agreed on the person who then actually won the 1993 
elections. 
 
In 1992-1993, there was a convergence of different forces, united by a common goal, and the 
first step of this convergence was the choice of a common candidate for the municipal 
elections. [...] The choice was not so linear, it was not a painless process without conflicts: we 
were initially criticized both by my party [PDS] colleagues and by the business community. 
 
The candidate, Valentino Castellani, won the elections at the second ballot. After the 
victory, the governing coalition had not yet established either clear boundaries or 
consolidated patterns of cooperation, and the business community was waiting for the  
first public actions that could demonstrate the existence of an effective alliance. As 
Castellani recognized, the first period as mayor was a trial period: 
 
The first months were terrible. I knew I had been elected with the support of a wide and 
completely new coalition, and I knew that everybody was looking at my first steps with the 
aim of understanding whether I would be able to consolidate the coalition and build some kind 
of trust among the members. 
 
The mayor and his entourage decided to start with the reform of the old Master Plan 
(Piano Regolatore Generale, PRG). The new PRG introduced many building permits 
and a major structural plan to place the huge railway line, which had divided the city 
into two parts for more than sixty years, underground. With the new PRG, some of the 
major public works that had been on hold for decades also received a decisive impulse. 
The decisional process that preceded the PRG reform and the start of the first major 
public works was incredibly fast: ‘in five months, we presented the new PRG and we 
then started the first public works’ (I.22). These choices actually favored the creation of 
a climate of trust with the local business community. 
A wide and heterogeneous governing coalition became consolidated in just a few 
years, and, in some ways, it managed to blend corporatist, managerial and pluralist traits 
(DiGaetano and Lawless 1999): politicians and civil servants, academics from both the 
University and the Politecnico di Torino, managers of the non-profit sector, as well as 
businessmen and civil society leaders at the vertex of the main organizations of interest 
(Belligni and Ravazzi 2012). 
As in many other urban regimes, over the following two decades Turin also 
witnessed the institutionalization of public-private organizations, such as foundations 
that were created in the culture sector,  development agencies that focused on tourism, 
ICT and movie production, and Torino Internazionale, the association that served to 
fuel wide support for the regime. On the whole, the governance arrangements worked 
around some key organizations: the Municipality, the Region, the two academic 
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institutions, the two bank foundations based in the city, and also FIAT in the first phase 
of the regime.11  
 
 
City dialogue 
 
The first policy change in urban planning led to a visible urban expansion and, in just a 
few years, the city was able to count on one of the highest rates of real estate 
transactions in Italy. However, the effects on the real estate market were not sufficient 
to brighten the gloomy horizon of the local economy. The disgruntled electorate of the 
1997 elections shifted partially toward the Right-wing candidate in the first round. In 
the second round, the incumbent mayor won, but just by a few thousand votes, to the 
astonishment of the governmental team and the members of the governing coalition. 
Shocked by this unexpected electoral result, the mayor decided to undertake a new 
route: to enlarge the boundaries of the governing coalition through a structured process 
of discussion with a wider group of civil society leaders. The process soon started and 
ended up with the publication of the first ‘Strategic Plan for the promotion of the city’. 
In February 2001, after three and a half years fifty prominent members of the local civil 
society met at the Politecnico di Torino to unanimously subscribe the Plan, which 
contained 6 strategic ‘lines’, 20 ‘objectives’ and 84 ‘actions’. The Strategic Plan was 
obviously not a concrete agenda and, like other Strategic Plans, it had more a symbolic 
value than a clear policy aim. Many ideas and actions were vague and unfeasible, and 
several expressions were similar to the ones of other ‘urban visioning exercises’ 
(Parnell and Robinson 2006, 339): ‘sustained economic growth’, ‘quality of life’, 
‘knowledge economy’, ‘empowerment’, ‘attractiveness’, ‘world-class city’, and so on. 
However, the core contents of the document also confirmed the common purposes that 
had been shared by the governing coalition during the previous years, and officialized 
some cornerstones for future policies12. 
The process that preceded the Plan is the key factor that can explain how the aims 
were translated into a shared program of public policies. The ‘power to’ of the urban 
regime took place through what can be called a ‘city dialogue’, which can be considered 
elitist because of the exclusion of opposition groups, associations and ordinary citizens, 
but it was also closer to a collective effort than a simple mix of sectorial negotiations. 
The mayor started with a first phase, called ‘Forum for development’, in which all 
the bankers, academics, members of interest groups, chief executives of corporations, as 
well as renowned ecclesiastical personalities and intellectuals in the city were invited to 
participate. One of the mayor’s collaborators recalled this phase as an attempt to 
concretize general goals within somewhat clearer policy boundaries: 
 
The Forum lasted about a year. We met approximately once every two months with all the 
prominent personalities of the city - members of the Industrial Union, the Chamber of 
Commerce, trade unions, academic institutions,  FIAT etc. - to discuss not only about how to 
revive the city, but also how to put our common purposes into practice. 
 
                                                
11 For a detailed explanation of how the public, private and quasi-governmental organizations contributed 
to the different axes of the policy agenda and to what extent, see  Belligni and Ravazzi (2012).  
12 Pinson (2002) rightly stated that the vagueness of a Strategic Plan can also be interpreted as a way of  
allowing a more flexible adaptation of the purposes to a changing urban environment and to the evolving 
urban challenges. 
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 Concrete policies were not actually formulated in the Forum meetings, but some 
suggestions about how to diversify the local economy began to emerge and become 
consolidated. In order to attract tourists, workers and capital, the city would have to 
become more beautiful and accessible, and the image of the grey town of the past would 
have to be converted into a new one, focusing on innovation and creativity. A member 
of the Forum remembered the leitmotif of those meetings: 
 
We established, all together, that Turin had to become a city of tourism, culture and 
innovation. The city had to attract tourists and talent, not only by improving the appearance 
and the possibility of enjoyment of public spaces, but also by creating a real 'culture system' 
and by stimulating the development of a knowledge economy based on highly skilled labour, 
creativity, and high technology. These ideas were already latent, but we gave them shape and 
an official status during the Forum. 
 
Once the main policy domains of the urban agenda had been outlined, it was 
considered imperative to design more concrete directions, in order to prevent the 
fragmentation of the proposed projects and initiatives. This second phase was structured 
combining information and discussion. Even though they were both closely intertwined, 
the informative session was mainly organized to build a platform of shared knowledge, 
while the dialogic phase was designed as a set of small group meetings with the task of 
formulating concrete ideas for future policies. A group of academic researchers was 
commissioned to draft a document on the social and economic situation of the city, and 
to propose some relevant issues that needed to be discussed. Some open seminars, 
focused on the experiences of other European cities, were held: the mayors of Bilbao, 
Stockholm, Munich, Glasgow and Barcelona were invited to talk about the progress 
made by the cities and to explain the development policies that their cities had 
implemented over the last few decades. Starting from this shared background, about 
sixty stakeholders and policy-makers (some of them already involved in the Forum), 
who were divided into working groups, met for about a year and a half. The working 
groups did not refer to any policy area in particular, but to general problems that had to 
be dealt with: how to launch Turin in the international context; how to integrate the city 
in the metropolitan area and in the region; how to enhance the local heritage; how to 
manage future population dynamics; how to diversify the local economy; how to 
promote sustainability; how to reduce inequalities. As one of the participants explained: 
 
The groups were coordinated by civil society leaders, not by politicians, and we met in the 
Congress Center of the Industrial Union. Some of the working group coordinators were the 
vice-president of  bank A, the president of company B, the chief executive of industry C, the 
general secretary of bank foundation D, the manager of financial company E, to name but a 
few. 
 
The result of this phase was that the main policy directions were established, and the 
effort of the subsequent years mainly became one of implementation. Since 2001, 
policy-making has in fact moved exactly along the binaries formulated by the working 
groups, even though the 2001 Strategic Plan produced a broader and mainly symbolic 
vision of the city. One of the leaders who took part in the city dialogue admitted that 
‘some actions put in the Plan were there just because they had to be there, not because 
we thought they were priorities, but the concrete initiatives that have been initiated over 
the following years emerged during those working groups’. 
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According to the interviewees, the city dialogue was not free from conflicts (in 
particular, different perspectives emerged about which policy sectors should be the core 
ones), but it was determinant in facilitating a somewhat collective construction of the 
new urban agenda, for three main reasons. First, its informal but structured and 
somehow public nature stimulated a constructive approach in the governing coalition 
actors and the general appreciation of many other collateral actors. As a public chief 
executive who took part in the process stated: 
 
This was actually the difference between the informal occasions we experienced in the past, 
lunching together or meeting in someone’s house, and the process that started with the Forum 
for development: in the former case, we always finished up with complaining about the 
problematic situation of the city, the immobilism of the local society, and proposing the 
solutions that were closest to our own interests; in the latter case, we managed to think in a 
purposive and collective way. I can’t precisely say why… maybe because of the more official 
and public nature of the process. 
 
Second, the multi-vocal process, although restricted to an urban élite, somehow 
worked as a multiplier of windows of opportunity (Kingdon 1984; 2011), allowing 
various policy entrepreneurs to convey their ideas in a multi-sectorial arena and to 
confront with more and diverse policy actors than the usual ones involved in normal 
policy networks. This simultaneous convergence of different policy windows was not 
planned, but it was facilitated by the structured setting of the process, whose main aims 
were to create highly heterogeneous policy arenas focused on specific goals. Some 
policy entrepreneurs from the business sector recognized that this combined 
heterogeneity of the participants and policy sectors favored a more integrated agenda-
building process and helped actors with different perspectives work on some common 
grounds. As two working group coordinators emphasized:  
 
In those discussions, hitherto non-communicating worlds talked to each other and this allowed 
us to build something that was widely shared, not just a sum of purposes defended and 
advocated by people or groups. 
 
The purposes we shared were not really new but we compared opinions with one another and 
reshaped the ones that had gained the highest consensus among people with diverse relevant 
interests and different perspectives on the city. 
  
Finally, the city dialogue also led to an internal management of the conflicts, 
which reduced the subsequent costs of the collateral compensations that usually 
characterize any urban regime. As another member of the governing coalition 
recognized: 
 
The working groups worked out aims and actions. Then, within this large matrix, policies 
often came to light incrementally or accidentally, but I think this is normal. Actually, the 
power of this initiative was mainly that tensions and disputes were dealt with during our 
discussions and not later. Most confrontations took place at this stage, and this generated 
confidence and more stable decisions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Today, Turin is not exactly what the governing coalition hoped it would be. Its image 
has changed profoundly (Vanolo 2015), but it is not yet become a high-tech metropolis 
or a touristic city. The leading sector of the local economy still remains the 
manufacturing industry, although it has become significantly downsized, and the city 
again seems to be wondering about its future and about ways of overcoming the global 
economic crisis. However, these considerations pertain to another story, which concerns 
the effectiveness of an urban regime. Regardless of the performance of the regime, the 
coalition that has governed the city over the last twenty years has undoubtedly managed 
to introduce non-incremental change to the consolidated policy mix through an 
ambitious pro-growth agenda. 
The attempt of the process-tracing analysis of this case has been to outline the key 
sequences that led to the emergence of the new agenda, in order to identify: a) the 
process through which a common frame was shaped by an emerging governing 
coalition, and b) the nature of the agenda-building process, in order to understand 
whether the policy agenda emerged as a by-product of a set of sectorial and almost 
independent policy-making processes or whether it was the result of a somewhat 
collective effort. 
As far as the first question is concerned, the analysis of the Turin case has 
highlighted how a process of reflection and debate in several local social and political  
environments has led to the shaping of a common frame by several components of the 
local élite. The main goal (to change toward a pro-growth mix of policies) and three 
shared aims (to diversify and requalify the local economy, to start with policies that 
could foster local economic growth in the short-term, and to build a wide alliance 
between public and private actors) emerged from this incubation period. This process 
developed in three stages, which broadly recall the classic model of dispute emergence 
(Felstiner et al. 1980): a naming process, which led to a clear perception of the critical 
situation of the city, a blaming process against the past urban politics, through which a 
narrative of the causes and responsibilities was framed, and a claiming process, which 
produced some core beliefs and some key purposes for a shared goal. These findings 
also offer empirical evidence on the theoretically and empirically underdeveloped issue 
of localism in urban regimes (De Socio 2010). In fact, the incubation process in Turin 
had clear localist traits, since the protagonists were local and the framing process was 
also focused on local dynamics.13  
The birth of the urban regime in Turin was officialized for the first time through the 
election of a mayor who was supported by a large coalition, composed of Center-Left 
wing forces and liberal components of the business community. The first policy 
changes were promoted through a new land-use regulation and some major 
infrastructures, but this was only the starting point to the development of trust within 
the rising governing coalition. 
Although chance played a role in the sequencing and combination of the events, the 
Turin city dialogue - the somewhat public, informal and structured process of 
discussion that started with the Forum for development - was decisive in allowing the 
collective construction of the new urban agenda, whose highly symbolic outcome was 
the 2001 City Strategic Plan. The urban regime arrangements naturally also included 
negotiations and self-interested exchanges on single issues. However, the structured and 
city-wide process of discussion was important, because it influenced the strategies of 
                                                
13 Also Pinson (2010) observed that urban governance in French cities (traditionally dominated by centre-
periphery relations) is increasingly characterized by localism. 
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the governing coalition members. It fostered a purposive approach, favored wider 
support from collateral actors and worked as a collector of several policy windows, by 
gathering different policy entrepreneurs at the same venue, making them confront each 
other and reflect on their issues from different viewpoints over a relatively short period. 
Furthermore, it allowed conflicts among coalition partners to be managed during the 
decision-making process instead of afterwards, thus reducing obstructions and impasses 
during the implementation processes. These findings suggest that the ‘power to’ of 
urban regimes could develop not only through standard negotiations and sectorial 
policy-making processes, which are typical of urban governance, but also through a 
city-wide collective effort, in some way more deliberative, although not necessarily 
more inclusive or attentive to social justice.  
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Figure 1. One of the largest brownfields converted into a residential area and the new 
underground railway covered by the new main boulevard. 
 
Source: www.urbancenter.to.it  
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Table 1. Research centers, business incubators and innovation poles in Turin 
 
Until 1993 
Name of organization  Mission Year 
Fondazione per l’Interscambio Scientifico research on complex systems 1983 
Fondazione Rosselli research on public policies 1988 
Associazione per la Promozione dello 
Sviluppo Scientifico e Tecnologico del 
Piemonte 
promotion of excellent research 1988 
Centro Supercalcolo Piemonte research on  information and communication 
technologies 
1988 
Consorzio Interuniversitario per la Fisica 
Spaziale 
research on astrophysics 1990 
Fondazione per le Biotecnologie technological innovation in life sciences 1991 
International Center for Economic Research research on economic topics 1991 
After 1993 
Name of organization  Mission Year 
Istituto per la Ricerca e la Cura del Cancro research on cancer 1996 
Environment Park business incubator in the environmental and 
renewable energy sectors 
1996 
Bioindustry Park business incubator in the life-science 
engineering sectors 
1999 
Virtual Reality & Multimedia Park multimedia business incubator 2000 
Istituto Superiore Mario Boella ICT research & development 2000 
Ist. Sup. sui Sistemi Territoriali per 
l’Innovazione 
research on  territorial innovation 2002 
Fondazione Torino Wireless ICT research & development 2002 
Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto research on  finance and labor economics 2004 
GM Powertrain research on  engine engineering 2005 
Centro di Conservazione e Restauro arts and culture conservation techniques 2005 
Centro design automotive design 2006 
Microsoft Center research on genetics and brain memory  
processes 
2007 
Human Genetics Foundation genetics research 2007 
Torino Piemonte Aerospace promotion of the aerospace sector 2007 
Centro Ricerche SMAT research on water treatment technologies 2008 
Progetto ITACA research on food quality and safety 
technologies 
2010 
Ecofood research on waste treatment 2010 
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Table 2. Large  events and the art system 
 
Until 1993 
Event Opening Museums and cultural activities Opening 
Torino Film Festival  1982 Renovation of the Old Arts Building  1989 
Gay Film Festival  1986 New Childhood Museum 1991 
National Book Exhibition 1987   
After 1993 
Event Opening Museums and cultural activities Opening 
Artissima 1994 Renewal of the Egyptian Museum 1994 
 International Athletics meeting  1995 Inauguration of the Fondazione Sandretto for contemporary arts 1995 
International Food Expo 1996 Art system in public spaces 1995 
Environmental Film Festival 1998 Cinema Museum 2000 
Chocolate Expo 2000 Film Commission 2001 
Torino Spiritualità 2002 Renovation of the Gobetti Theater 2001 
Terra Madre international 
meeting 2004 New History Museum 2003 
‘Traffic’ Music Festival  2004 New Museum of the Environment 2004 
 European Ice-skating 
competition  2005 
Renovation of the Valentino Castle 
medieval village 2004 
‘Italyart’ Olympic Games 2005 Theater Fonderie Limone 2005 
Winter Olympic Games 2006 Renovation of the Astra Theater 2005 
Paralympics 2006 New Vittoria Theater 2005 
World Fencing Championship 2006 New Theater for Young people 2005 
Chess Olympics 2006 Renovation of the Royal Armory Museum 2005 
University Olympics 2007 Renovation of the Carignano Theater 2005 
World Architect conference 2008 New Merz Foundation 2005 
Events for the World design 
capital 2008 
Renovation of the Natural Science 
Museum 2006 
European archery championship 2008 Renovation of the Mountain Museum 2006 
Democracy Festival 2009 Renovation of the Royal Venaria Palace 2007 
Events for the celebration of the 
anniversary of the Italian 
unification 
2011 New Museum of Astronomy and aerospace 2007 
  Renovation of the Queen’s Palace 2007 
  New Museum of Antiques 2007 
  Renovation of the Royal Palace 2007 
  Renovation of the Mazzoni building 2008 
  New Cultural Center at Spina 2 2008 
  Renovation of the Automotive Museum 2011 
  Partial renovation of the old Prison building 2011 
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